

The Challenges of Russian Migration Policy:
The Influence of Ethnic Nationalism

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1. Introduction

The task of nation-building that has occurred during the 23 years since the fall of the Soviet Union created conditions wherein Russia's relationship with the West has run the spectrum from ally to adversary, contributing to an ever challenging policy environment. Russian foreign policy decisions are a perplexing combination of residual relationships from the Cold War (Syria, Iran) and projections of power in its Near Abroad¹ (Georgia, Ukraine), while Russian domestic policy is often haphazard and contradictory to Russia's needs. This is especially clear in domestic policy towards immigration.

Russia is in the midst of a demographic crisis that has seen its population shrink by seven million people in just over 20 years due to the combined influence of a low birth rate, temporarily high mortality rate, and emigration (Judah, 2013). Had it not been for the approximately 12 million migrants (MPC, 2013) over the same period – largely from CIS countries – the proportion of the crisis would be significantly worse. Projecting forward, the World Bank estimates that the combination of low birth rates and an aging population will lead to a labor shortage of approximately 25 million workers by 2050. (World Bank, 2011). The Russian government has identified this as the chief economic threat to national security (Molchanov, 2013), yet the severity of the crisis has not led to proper policy solutions, a reflection of the current challenges within Russia; challenges intertwined with Russia's post-Soviet identity.

¹ A Russo-centric term that comprises much of the former Soviet Union.

An examination of Russian immigration policy provides a lens through which a better understanding of Russian actions can be viewed. Russian dependence on immigration for population growth and stability cannot be understated: when migration flows dropped in between 2001-2006, natural population decline increased and total population growth fell (MPC, 2013). Migration policy – with specific regards to labor migrants from former CIS countries in Central Asia – will significantly influence the future of Russia. As such, migration policy involves and affects nearly every aspect of Russian society and politics. While this paper touches on these areas, it is not a thorough examination of such interconnectedness. Rather, this paper will examine Russian migration policy from its genesis to its current form, highlighting influential legislation that has made a lasting impact. Such legislation reflects the dynamics of the Russian political system; therefore, an analysis of the system that has increasingly supported an ethnic definition of Russia as engineered by the presidency of Vladimir Putin is warranted. Combined, this background informs an analysis of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation to 2025 (SMPRF), the most recent attempt at reforming migration policy.

1.1 Problem Definition

There are approximately 8.9 million migrants working in Russia, comprising approximately 11% of the workforce.² Of this total, 2.9 million hold official work permits, a necessary component to legal employment in Russia (OECD, 2014): A cumbersome, highly bureaucratic process that most migrants avoid. Thus, the remaining 6 million migrants work outside of legal channels, earning a tax-free, cash wage that is often a fraction of what legally registered workers receive. By pushing both employers and labor migrants to the margins of

² This estimation is based on official statistics indication 2.9 million registered migrant workers, combined with an OECD estimate of 6 million irregular (or unregistered) migrant workers. Other sources estimate a range between 3 million and 10 million unregistered migrants working in Russia.

legality, Russian migration policy can be seen as a failure, effectively increasing the number of irregular migrants working in the country. The challenge for Russia involves untangling a contradictory policy arena that both supports and opposes migrant labor. Rhetorically, Russia supports policy alternatives increasing the ability of migrants to work freely in Russia. This signifies an official recognition of the importance migrant labor plays in the economy and the importance of bringing migrants into the fold of regulated labor. However, such recognition is seemingly limited to mere rhetoric given the adoption of myriad laws imposing increasingly strict conditions pertaining to migrant labor. These laws – often supported by an increasingly xenophobic public – maintain the status quo: an underground labor economy exploited by employers.

The policy environment is increasingly challenged by the dominance of ethnic nationalism over civic nationalism in competition for Russia's post-Soviet identity; a dominance that has paralleled the rise of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the increasing influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. In broad terms, ethnic nationalism is equated with "Russia for the Russians," a concept that supports limiting citizenship to ethnic Russians.³ Endemic to this concept is a determination of what defines an ethnic Russian, a largely (perhaps intentionally) undefined category. In contrast, civic nationalism involves a Russian state that encompasses a diverse population united through shared cultural norms and values; a concept largely equated with the failure of Western reforms following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

1.2 Irregular vs. Illegal

³ Debate ranges within Russia over what defines an ethnic Russian, a complex issue that draws upon Russia's experience as a multi-ethnic society. One could argue that defining what comprises an ethnic Russian is endemic to the challenges this paper presents. For the purpose of distinguishing population groups, I define ethnic Russians as Slavic citizens of the Russian federation. In using this definition, I am not making a normative statement, nor do I claim to solve the current debate. This distinction is merely a necessary component of discussing ethnic nationalism in Russia; a distinction that omits Russian citizens of non-Slavic descent.

For the purpose of my discussion, I use the term *irregular* when discussing labor migrants. With respect to the receiving country, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration as “entry, stay, or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations” (IOM, 2014). The documents in question are either work permits or patents, two forms of licensing required by the Russian Federation. This is preferred over *illegal labor migration* given the pejorative weight behind the word illegal. Furthermore, irregular labor migration better describes conditions in Russia given that the majority of migrants are entering legally from CIS countries where visa requirements (for entering Russia) are waived.⁴

2. The Migrants

Understanding modern Russian migration involves a grasp of a new center-periphery relationship that dominates Russian society and politics. The breakup of the Soviet Union presented a number of challenges for its former republics, specifically those located in Central Asia and the Caucasus. For a short time, independence from the Soviet Union and integration with the world community ruled the day, prompting migration outflows⁵ that included the return of ethnic Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, and other Central Asians from Russia to their newly independent countries. Despite a wave of repatriation to ethnic homelands and a tumultuous economic situation, Russia remained both the regional hegemon and the dominant economic power and maintained de facto control of the newly independent republics.

Twenty-three years later, the reality of Russian dominance affects the daily lives of the

⁴ Legal entry without a visa is controlled at border crossings and limits migrants to a 90 day stay in Russia every 180 days—a condition indicated on a foreign national’s passport. Given the length of the Russian border and the irregularity of data collection, existing numbers for irregular migrants are estimates.


⁵ According to ROSSTAT, the top destinations for Russian emigrants in the early 90s were Germany, Israel, and the United States.

former Soviet republics. Independence did not provide prosperity or security, and Russia has become increasingly involved in providing both economic opportunities and national security. Within the economic sphere, Russia is the top import market in both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and second only to China in the Kyrgyz Republic (CIA, 2014). Russian dominance of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) guarantees Russian involvement in military affairs while the prospect of admission into the Eurasian Customs Union (including Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia) encourages the perpetuation of economic terms largely favorable to Russia. Furthermore, democratic elections have served largely to legitimize one-party, semi-authoritarian rule.⁶ This concentration of power has done little to modernize these countries and subsequently provide opportunities for their citizens. Accordingly, many persons from Central Asian countries – who twenty years previously would have been Soviet citizens – have become economic migrants, seeking opportunity in Russia.

2.1 Who are they?

482,241 migrants were officially granted temporary or permanent residency permits in 2013 (ROSSTAT, 2014). Of this number, 87% were from CIS countries; 48% from the former Soviet Central Asian states (figure 1, below).

⁶ For example, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been in power since 1990. Tajikistan fares better: President Emomahli Rahmon has been in power since 1994.




Irregular migrant labor comprises a larger figure: the OECD states that approximately 6 million migrants working irregularly in Russia,⁷ with approximately 80% of these individuals emigrating from the Central Asian countries of the CIS, including Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (OECD, 2012). Migrants from these countries travel to Russia in search of labor and are typically young males who have very low levels of knowledge of Russian language, few skills, and no knowledge of Russian laws, rules, and norms (MPC, 2014).

2.2 What do they do?

Irregular labor migrants in Russia are typically employed in the least regulated jobs, including retail work, services, manufacturing, agriculture, and construction (Metelev, 2014), often without the benefit of a contract or formal agreement (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2013). Despite an increase in unemployment resulting from the 2008 global economic crisis, these jobs have been eschewed by Russian citizens, who prefer unemployment over the stigma of working as a construction worker or laborer (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2012). Accordingly, migrant workers do

⁷ Typically, irregular labor is measured as a residual number taken from the total number of foreign born persons living in Russia, last recorded in 2002. Subtracted from this number are annual figures including individuals with work permits, temporary residents and guests, and patent holders. These leads to a “best guess” of irregular labor that can vary from year to year and from official to official. The OECD figure of 6 million should be considered a fair estimate, given that various sources cited in this paper quoted figures ranging from 3 -11 million irregular labor migrants.

not report competition from Russian citizens as negatively impacting their job prospects (ibid.)



Source: ROSSTAT (2007)

An important recent trend involves the employment of female irregular migrants. As of 2012, approximately 2/3 of all female irregular migrants were employed by individuals in the personal care sector (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2012). The presence of female migrants is in accordance with a broader trend indicating increased female labor migration, as distinct from migration for reunification or lifestyle migration (Hanlon & Vicino, 2014). Like their male counterparts, female migrants tend to be isolated to certain industries, particularly those related to domestic service, childcare, and eldercare.

2.3 Why migrate to Russia?

A number of conditions make Russia a favorable destination for labor migrants. Primarily, a visa exception for persons from CIS countries makes entry into Russia an easy

process.⁸ Additionally, stagnant economic growth within CIS countries has limited the growth of real wages, making Russia an attractive destination (table 1, below).

Table 1: Comparison of economic conditions between select CIS countries

Country	Unemployment, 2013	Average Monthly Wage, 2013 (USD)
Kyrgyz Republic	8.3%	\$262
Russian Federation	5.5%	\$912
Tajikistan	---	\$200
Uzbekistan	4.9	\$300

Source: Interstate Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 2013

At the same time, high prices for both oil and hydrocarbons have fostered an economic boom in Russia. With specific regard to Moscow and St. Petersburg,⁹ both cities are experiencing labor shortages in the low-skilled sectors that have traditionally attracted labor migrants (Metelev, 2014). These circumstances are likely to be affected by the international sanctions related to Russia's role in fostering conflict in eastern Ukraine and decrease in prices for hydrocarbon and petroleum exports; however, labor migrants have become a structural aspect of the Russian economy (Korobkov, 2008) and, while a downturn can be expected, such conditions will not affect the flow of migrants to Russia. The Russian experience during the 2008 economic crisis exhibited the resilience of the demand for irregular labor: estimates by the IOM indicate that the highly segmented nature of irregular labor left it largely unaffected during the economic slowdown (IOM, 2009). Additionally, while government data showed a decline in formally employed foreign workers during the 2008 economic crisis, remittances to home countries during this same period increased, illustrating an increase in irregular labor (IOM, 2014).

⁸ In contrast, the process for getting a travel or work visa is complex, requiring significant paperwork that further involves mailing a passport to a Russian counsel. Additional requirements, including an HIV test and criminal background check, may be required depending on the type of visa and duration of stay.

⁹ It is estimated that 50% of labor migrants travel to either Moscow or St. Petersburg.

Ultimately, a slowdown in Russia is more likely to affect sending countries by disrupting trade and investment, causing economic strife that could lead to increased unemployment and ultimately increasing the number of labor migrants traveling to Russia.

The existence of a strong Central Asian diaspora also makes Russia an attractive destination. Diasporas often assume the role of informal migration services, providing newly-arrived migrants help in finding employment and housing. Additionally, where confusing and arcane migration laws exist (as in Russia), diasporas become the semi-official source for information for newly arrived labor migrants (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2013). In some cases, the draw of the diaspora group becomes so strong that ethnic enclaves develop, ostensibly limiting the need for migrants to integrate into Russian society (Molchanov, 2013).

2.4. Migrant Perceptions

Within the Russian Federation, migrants are largely viewed as individuals who have traveled to Russia to earn money; however, such a definition negatively equates *migrant* with individuals occupying the lowest rungs of Russian society (Abashin, 2013). Migrants are portrayed as significantly undercutting the domestic labor market due to the significantly lower wages paid to migrants, a condition that creates the perception of a significant rivalry between ethnic Russians and migrants. This perception is misleading: migrant workers have been shown to have a minimal effect on job numbers within Russia (Karpova & Vorona, 2014). Despite statistics indicating otherwise (Interfax, 2013), migrants are also believed to increase overall crime rates. When crimes do occur, the Russian media focuses on the ethnic differences between migrants and Russians as a major factor. An example of this involves the October 2013 murder of an ethnic Russian by an Azerbaijani migrant. Following the arrest, the Russian media focused on presenting the suspect as “aggressive, hot-tempered, and an abuser of alcohol with no

permanent address” (Herszenhorn, 2013), and highlighted the lack of integration of Azerbaijani migrants in the southwest Moscow suburb of Biryulyovo. This became a continuous thread throughout Russian media, leading to interviews with (Russian) Biryulyovo residents who recounted numerous incidents of the lawlessness of the migrants living and working in the suburb (despite a lack of evidence). Ultimately, this perpetuated a stereotype that encouraged nationalist sympathies and further contributed to the continuation of difficult circumstances for migrant populations within Russia.

3. Migration Policy in Russia

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian migration policy has worked through a number of iterations, from initial support for migrants to increased securitization in accordance with a popular view of migration as a problem. The result is a policy beset with contradictions and inconsistency between demographic needs and federal migration policy (Riazantsev, 2013).

3.1 History

In the period immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, migration policy focused on creating conditions favorable for the return of the ethnic Russian diaspora scattered throughout the now independent Soviet republics. This led to the granting of visa-free travel between members of the newly-formed Commonwealth of Independent States,¹⁰ the primary condition that allows irregular migration to flourish (MPC, 2013). Estimates from the period between 1993 and 2001 show that more than 13 million individuals were repatriated into Russia, a majority of whom were ethnic Russians (ibid). At this time, virtually no support or integration programs were in place, given a common language, relatively high levels of education, and

¹⁰ The omission of the Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania from this provision has created an alternative migration challenge for Russians living in these countries, wherein they currently have no official status and as a result face extreme difficulties in securing exit visas.

transferrable skill sets learned under Soviet rule (MPC, 2014).

At the same time, little consideration for labor migration and its potential impact were made. Three conditions were largely responsible for the lack of attention to labor migration. First, the post-Soviet economic crisis limited both economic opportunity in Russia and decreased its attractiveness as a destination for migrants. Second, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, gaining Russian citizenship was a simple process: former citizens of the Soviet Union residing outside of the Russian Federation could become citizens by filling out a simple form (Lohr, 2012). Moreover, such encouragement was supported by tolerance and acceptance of dual-citizenship with the independent republics (*ibid*), although this proved to be largely one-sided (on behalf of the Russians). Finally, the initial wave of migrants were largely indistinguishable in both appearance and in language, two factors that often prevent integration in Russian society. As such, these individuals were often perceived as fellow Soviet citizens, rather than Belorussians or Ukrainians (MPC, 2014).

The Federal Migration Service (FMS) was founded in 1992 under the concept of assisting migrants and refugees with finding employment and housing (Flynn, 2004). Institutionalized support quickly waned in accordance with a gradual reversal of the hertofore liberal attitude towards migration, with the touchstone for securitization being the first Chechen War (1994-96). From this point on, the mission of the FMS changed from a supportive to a restrictive role, stating that “uncontrollable migration is acquiring a threatening character, aggravating the epidemiological, criminal, and social situation in major cities, and causing harm to the security of the country” (Robarts, 2008). Thus, the FMS became increasingly involved in controlling and limiting migration flows into the Russian Federation via increased policing and deportation and a gradual rollback of liberal migration policies leading to significant reforms in 2002.

Reforms

In 2002, Russia revised its citizenship law allowing only former Soviet citizens who had lived within the borders of the Russian federation access to Russian citizenship through the simplified procedure. In addition, new laws were created distinguishing foreign citizens and stateless persons, further establishing three legal categories and corresponding permits¹¹ for their stay on Russian territory: 1. Temporary sojourning foreign citizens, which grants up to a 90 day stay in Russia without a visa; 2. Temporary resident foreign citizens, a category requiring foreign nationals to hold a non-renewable permit authorizing residency in Russia for up to three years; 3. Permanent resident foreign citizens, a category requiring foreign nationals to hold a renewable permit authorizing residency in Russia for up to five years (Abashin, 2013; FMS, 2014). Citizenship requirements become more stringent as well: former Soviet citizens that had not resided in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union now had to provide evidence of a legal source of income, renounce their previous citizenship, and demonstrate proficiency in the Russian language (Shevel, 2011a). The impetus behind this revision was a belief that the liberal naturalization process was creating two crises: a national security crisis involving the naturalization of criminals, and an economic crisis relating to the increased burden on the state economy (once newly naturalized individuals reached pension age). In addition, it was argued that the predominantly Muslim migrants from Central Asia posed a security threat; an argument that conveniently grouped all Central Asian migrants into a monolith supportive of Islamic extremism.

In 2002, the FMS was absorbed into the Ministry of Internal Affairs, creating a vertical power structure with a direct line to the office of president. Decisions related to migration policy

¹¹ And corresponding visa requirements.

became highly influenced by presidential initiatives, a condition that allowed for the manipulation of policy to garner favorable public opinion. Thus, as concerns over terrorism rose in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, the president was able to rapidly affect legislation that increased the restrictions for migrant inflow, buttressing his support amongst the population.

Such changes also mark a distinct change in the development of Russia's post-Soviet identity, from a support of civic nationalism to a support for ethnic nationalism. Such conditions were not unique to Russia. Increasingly, multiculturalism in was viewed in some European countries as having weakened national cultures and identities. This factor, when coupled with the prevalence of security politics following 9/11, caused countries to turn to nationalist policy solutions as a means of cultural renewal (Kostakopoulou, 2014). Accordingly, within Russia, the definition of *Russian* was called into question and a set in motion a process that significantly narrowed the definition from a non-ethnic territorial delineation to a largely ethnic definition. Restricting citizenship appealed to the increasingly ethnic nationalist tendencies within Russia, yet it also limited the means by which Russia could support population groups outside of Russia by offering citizenship: a significant constraint on Russia's ability to unilaterally intervene in its near abroad. From 2003- 2010, a series of amendments to the citizenship law were made including provisions to support veterans of both Russian and Soviet armies and individuals that received higher education in Russia. These amendments maintained support for ethnic nationalism, serving as a filter that allowed the government keep undesirable populations on the margins of Russia, while liberalizing naturalization for persons it felt were a benefit to society (Lohr, 2012). Subsequent amendments would support the naturalization of persons outside of Russia and serve as a bedrock for Russia's behavior in the near abroad in the subsequent years.

4. Current Policy

The result of 20 years of amendments and revisions has left Russian migration policy a confusing tangle of contradictions and anachronisms. Current policy is a blend of laws that support desired populations, including the recent attempt to attract individuals with high technical ability¹² for permanent settlement in Russia by offering a series of incentives and benefits. These supportive policies come at the expense of migrant populations facing an increasingly restrictive policy environment that makes conditions for low-skilled labor migrants difficult and confusing. Russia has considered this increased securitization necessary for protecting both the economic and physical security of its citizens. While it's true that Russia needs such high-skilled individuals, such one-sided focus belies the demographic reality that Russia faces in the coming years. Additionally, throughout myriad iterations of migration policy, Russia has maintained its open border practice with CIS countries, the main condition allowing irregular migrants into Russia.

4.1 Quota System


The process for obtaining a temporary work permit is a multi-stage, highly bureaucratic affair. Labor migrants must first register their residence with the FMS, a condition that grants a 90 day permit to stay in Russia. Following this, migrants can apply for a work permit with the FMS provided they have the proper documentation package.¹³ Assuming the process is approved quickly, this grants a worker less than 90 days of legal employment in country. However, work permits are viewed as one component of the real goal: a temporary residency permit granting the holder the right to stay in Russia for up to three years. Temporary residency does not, however,

¹² Civic engineers top the list.

¹³ Comprised of a passport-sized photo, migration card, and identification from the migrant's home country, and a receipt showing that a 1,000 ruble fee was paid.

automatically extend a work permit – doing so requires returning to the FMS to apply for a 1-year extension on a work permit. All totaled, migrants seeking both work permits and temporary residency can expect a minimum of four trips to a FMS office.

In a given year, the number of total permits is based on a quota system determined solely by Russian employers who apply for permits in the preceding year. Separate quotas are established for citizens of the CIS and foreign citizens in general, with the majority of permits allotted for the former. Additionally, quotas are assigned for low-skilled labor, while high-skilled, desired populations are exempt via an annual list of professions that are not subjected to the quota. In 2014, 1,631,586 quotas were allotted by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection. The number of quotas fluctuates from year to year, but has steadily decreased since 2009 (see figure 3, below).



While normally the purview of Russian businesses, in 2007, the Russian government intervened in the quota assignment process, arbitrarily assigning a quota of 6 million work permits. While it is unclear whether all 6 million permits were distributed, the result of such a high number meant that, in 2008, business leaders did submit applications, expecting a similar number. As a result, the 2008 quota was set at 1.5 million, a figure below the actual number of registered workers in 2007 (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2012). Government intervention in the quota system occurred again in 2009 when, under pressure from protests against the hiring of foreign

workers, then Prime Minister Putin suggested that the 2009 quota (set at 4 million permits) should be halved. The government quickly followed suit, passing legislation granting the government the authority to modify quotas after the annual allocation was set (IOM, 2009).

Enforcement of laws pertaining to temporary work permits is the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), following its officially designated responsibilities to control the prevention of illegal migration (Robarts, 2008). Foreign nationals found working without a permit face deportation and a possible three year ban on reentry to Russia (FMS, 2012). In 2013, the FMS (now a division of the MOI) reported deporting 82,413 individuals. Mass enforcement events are more likely to occur than routine incidents, due to the structural importance migrant labor plays in the Russian economy. These events are often used by political elites to bolster support around elections by appealing to nationalist sentiments. In the 2013 mayoral campaign, incumbent mayor Sergei Sobyenin boasted of having cleansed the city of illegal immigrants and created a Potemkin camp of “arrested” irregular migrants awaiting deportation outside of Moscow (Judah, 2013). Employers found using irregular labor are subject to fines and imprisonment (Obrazkova, 2013); however, under normal circumstances, enforcement can be considered lackluster at best: corruption within the official ranks allows business leaders, reliant on cheap migrant labor, to bribe FMS and police officials to turn a blind eye to irregular migrant labor.

4.4 Serfdom 2.0

Despite poor working conditions, a paternalistic relationship develops between employers and employees that maintains the loyalty of migrant workers. For those holding work permits, this is the result of federal regulations that link permit holders to a specific employer, a condition that makes changing jobs difficult. For irregular laborers, the employer is seen as the

protector-benefactor of migrant workers, defending them from the prosecution by the police and deportation by the FMS (Metelev, 2014). Migrants fear that, by asking for too much or complaining too loudly, they risk losing favor with an employer who could easily turn them over to the FMS. In return, employers exploit irregular labor, paying migrants 80% less than their Russian counterparts (Judah, 2013). Additionally, the lack of organized labor among migrant workers – even those holding work permits – means that employers are not beholden to workplace standards regarding both physical and psychological treatment of employees.

4.5 Diasporas

Rather than following official channels, migrants in Russia often turn to diasporas to fulfill their needs. In turn, diasporas maintain a steady stream of labor that is often exploited in a manner similar to their ethnic Russian counterparts. The reliance on diasporas has led to a perception of enclavization wherein officials believe that migrant groups eschew any attempts at broader integration preferring to become a society within a society, where only the broadest Russian laws apply and knowledge of the Russian language is not a prerequisite for daily business. These enclaves often pop up in lower class suburbs of large cities; suburbs which tend to have high unemployment (among Russian citizens) and a citizen base resentful of migrants for what they perceive as preferential treatment from the government. This low-simmering resentment is often exploited by nationalist groups to bolster their ranks. This nationalist sentiment, often in line with the concept of “Russia for the Russians,” is one of two competing frameworks dominating Russia’s post-Soviet concept of state.

4.2 Compatriot Act

In describing the breakup of the Soviet Union, President Putin described the “drama” that “tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory”

(BBC, 2005; Panov, 2010). In response, legislation was enacted that would allow Russia to support persons outside of the country. The “State Policy of the Russian Federation on Compatriots Abroad” (Compatriots Act) amended a 1999 law¹⁴ that had previously designated compatriots as persons born outside of the Russian Federation, but share similar language, culture, and religion (Shevel, 2011b). While this original legislation was abolished with the 2002 amendments to naturalization policy, it was resurrected in 2007 in support of the Compatriots Resettlement Act, an effort that provided a robust support system to qualified migrants willing to be resettled in priority areas. In 2008, the new Compatriots Act included provisions for simplified naturalization in tune with the liberal policies of the 90s. In 2010, the law was further amended to include language defining compatriots as persons that make a conscious decision in favor of Russian cultural traditions or are related to ethnicities that have traditionally resided on the territory of the Russian Federation. The opacity of the amended law is seen by some as intentional vagueness that provides a broad definition of compatriot (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2013; Lohr, 2012; Shevel, 2011b). Moreover, by intentionally withholding definitions of culture, language, and ethnicity from all versions of the Compatriot Act, Russia has legal cover to define nearly any population group as a compatriot and act in accordance with foreign policy goals.

5.0 Redefining the Russian State

The changing landscape of Russian policy towards migration reflects the shifting attitude surrounding Russia’s post-Soviet identity. The challenge in the immediate aftermath was viewed as the need to move beyond communism; a challenge that was met by embracing Western concepts of civic nationalism. Tied to this concept were expectations that, by embracing Western

¹⁴ Specifically, this was an attempt by the Duma to circumvent the rejection of dual-citizenship proposals between Russia and several former CIS countries.

concepts, Russia would reap economic rewards. When these rewards proved elusive, blame was cast on the Western reforms as being foreign to Russian ideals.

5.1 Civic Nationalism in Russia

Defining a country in terms of civic nationalism involves a recognition that all persons living within the borders of a country can be included as citizens (Muller, 2008). Embracing this definition in the Russian Federation paralleled the adoption en masse of economic, political, and societal reforms often categorized under the label of liberalism. Post communism, such reform was supported by society at large and political elites¹⁵ who considered supporting the antithesis of communism as the chief means to promote the development of Russia. The inclusiveness of civic nationalism marks the period of open migration and simplified citizenship that distinguished the initial post-Soviet citizenship laws (Robarts, 2008). Such openness was seemingly short lived. The First Chechen war (1994-96) initiated a wave of securitization, supported by a public that increasingly believed that migrants – particularly those from Central Asia and the Caucasus – were sympathetic to the Islamic extremism thought intrinsic to the war in Chechnya. At the same time, Russia was entering a protracted economic crisis. Combined, these conditions lead to the erosion of public support for the liberalization of Russia in accordance with Western norms. Additionally, Russians became increasingly strident in their belief that the Russian nationality was the titular nationality, pointing to the legal recognition of Russian as the official language and the use of the nationality *Russian* in the official country name (Khazanov, 1997). Under these circumstances the inevitable rise of ethnic nationalism can be viewed.

¹⁵ Not in total, as exemplified first by the coup attempts of the early 90s and the continued presence of the Communist party within Russian politics.

5.2 Ethnic Nationalism

Ethnic nationalism involves a selective view of citizenship, with key elements including shared heritage, language, and a common faith (Muller, 2008). The perceived failure of Western reforms (supported by civic nationalism), and the move towards an ethnic identity led to the rejection of the West and a turn to the development of a “Russian” way that would draw heavily upon the shared heritage surrounding Russian ethnicity, collective identification as “Russian,” and the shared religious heritage of the Russian Orthodox Church (Khazanov, 1997). Support was mustered by the assertion that unfettered migration diluted Russian culture and further hastened the loss of traditional values in accordance with the long-waning influence of the Orthodox Church (Peregudov, 2014).

The rise of ethnic nationalism was further facilitated by an ideological vacuum left after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While western proponents of civic nationalism focused on dismantling the remnants of Soviet symbols and practices, there was no ideological replacement to unite the public. When the pendulum shifted, ethnic nationalism filled this void by returning to a historical narrative of Russia’s special course or divine role in the world order. Filling this void was a necessary requirement in rebuilding the psyche of the Russian population. The pervasiveness of Soviet propaganda in proclaiming the importance of the Soviet Union in international affairs (as an alternative to the Western democracy) and in promoting and protecting communist regimes across the world had created a sense of importance amongst the Russian people. When communism collapsed, the near immediate loss of Russian power in international affairs combined with a lack of economic opportunity created a strong feeling of humiliation pervasive throughout the Russian Federation (Khazanov, 1997). Without the central

role of the state, individuals turned to ethnic groupings for solidarity and enmity (Muller, 2008) and reinvented the mythology of the Russian ethnicity. Concurrent to this movement was the rise of Vladimir Putin.

5.3 Putin and Ethnic Nationalism

Prior to his election in 2000, Vladimir Putin offered three pillars on which the Russia state should stand, namely patriotism, power, and statism (Cannady & Kubicek, 2014). Inasmuch as these pillars proved successful during the election campaign, they also served as an attempt to counter the feelings of national inadequacy that plagued Russia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, these three pillars are a common theme throughout Putin's three terms as president: in particular, the concept of statism, or the belief that the state should have significant influence in a society and economy, supports much of the vertical restructuring of power that has accompanied Putin's rule. In addition, patriotism involves a sense of pride in Russian historic accomplishments and institutions, none of which have been more important than the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) of whom Putin has stated "is a symbol of the rebirth and reunification of the Russian people"(Cannady & Kubicek, 2014). Reconstructing the tight-knit relationship between the ROC and the Russian government creates a symbiotic relationship: the ROC grants the state legitimacy by supporting state-favored candidates, while the ROC is granted legitimacy through its position as the unofficial state religion¹⁶ (Gaskova, 2004). In support of this, the U.S. Department of State (2013) reports that:

Despite a constitutional separation of church and state, in practice the government cooperated more closely with the ROC than with other religious organizations. The ROC had a number of formal and informal agreements with government ministries giving it

¹⁶ In November, 2013, a proposal to grant the Russian Orthodox Church a "special role" was presented to the Duma for debate. To date, no further action has been taken on this proposal.

greater access than other religious organizations to public institutions such as schools, hospitals, prisons, police, and the military forces. The government also provided the Russian Orthodox patriarch with security guards and access to official vehicles, a privilege accorded no other religious organization.

This provides the ROC with the ability to influence policy outcomes favorable to their position in society, including a special provision making the ROC the only religious organization allowed to review draft legislation before the State Duma (U.S. Department of State, 2013). The ROC has used this power to limit non-native churches from purchasing land and or receiving building permits, an important consideration given the potential of a population shift that would see the Islamic population increase 20% by 2020 (Light, 2012). Furthermore, the liberal policies of the 90s were correlated with the waning influence of the ROC and the overall deterioration of living conditions. Embracing the ROC is viewed as embracing a return to the values that once drove the country to greatness; a mythologizing that requires defining Russia under ethnic terms.

Support for ethnic nationalism remains a pillar of Putin's Russia; however, the reality of the multi-ethnic nature of Russian society is increasingly unavoidable. In his article, "Russia: The Ethnic Issue," Putin laid the foundation for the duplicitous attitude towards migrants that exists today, outlining the importance of a modern migration policy for the preservation of a multi-ethnic society while also claiming a special place for ethnic Russians, Russian culture, and Russian language as the glue that holds society together. Further supporting this assertion, Putin claims that "The civilizational identity of the Russian federation is based on the preservation of Russian cultural dominance"(Putin, 2012). The nature of the address is less about finding mutual ground and creating an inclusive, multi-national Russian society as it is an attempt at curtailing the rising xenophobia within Russia that accompanies support for ethnic nationalism. Regardless,

the address illustrates the current circumstance wherein control over migration policy rests in the hands of one person; a person who's ties to the ROC and ethnic groups prevents a modern migration policy in line with Russia's demographic situation.

6. The 2025 Concept and the Failure of Reform

The State Migration policy concept of the Russian Federation to 2025¹⁷ (SMPRF) is a strategic document created by a government commission (decreed by an executive order). The document is an attempt to address the coming demographic crisis through maintaining national security, stabilizing and increasing the resident population of the Russian Federation, and modernizing the Russian economy. Implementation of the migration policy would be achieved in three stages: an active stage (2012-2015), a monitoring stage (2016-2020); and an assessment stage (2021-2025). While the document itself is not law, approval by the president gives the objectives within the document priority stature within the Russian policy process and further ensures that presidential oversight will be frequent and robust.

Official statements outline the document's recognition of migration as "an important part of the social, economic, and demographic policy of the Russian Federation" (Egorova, 2012); however, analysis of the document and subsequent passage of laws surrounding the document illustrate the influence ethnic nationalism continues to have on Russian migration policy.

The specificities of reform are outlined in section III, 23 of the SMPRF. The seven key directives are outlined below:

1. Creation of conditions and incentives for the relocation of the compatriots and emigrants living abroad and certain categories of foreign nationals for permanent residence in the Russian Federation
2. Development of different means to attract, select, and use foreign labor
3. Promotion of internal migration
4. Promotion of educational migration and support for academic mobility

¹⁷ A full rendering of the applicable section appears in appendix a.

5. Implementation of humanitarian obligations for forced migrants
6. Promotion of adaptation and integration of migrants and the formation of constructive interaction between migrants and the host community
7. Combatting illegal migration

Remarkably, the document focuses not on easing conditions for migrant labor – which would immediately impact the demographic crisis – but on attracting the right kind of migrants: highly educated specialists, entrepreneurs, investors, compatriots, and emigrants. Such conditions are an attempt to both stem the demographic crisis and provide the Russian economy with the professions necessary to carry out the modernization the Russian economy requires to remain competitive as a global market; a competitiveness that has seen Russia fall behind fellow members of the BRIC nations due in large part to its lack of economic diversity and reliance on energy exports.

In determining the success of the policy at the tail-end of the active stage, the below analysis will focus on four areas of the SMPRF: resettlement support, infrastructure development, integration assistance, and illegal migration. Determining the success of the SMPRF focuses on 16 constitutional amendments¹⁸ related to migration passed subsequent to the presidential approval (of the SMPRF), and their ability substantially alter the composition of Russian migration law.

6.1 Resettlement Support (Section III, 24, a)

The vague nature of the compatriot act (see 4.2) can be viewed as justification for Russian military intervention under the auspice of protecting individuals abroad. In this section of the SMPRF, compatriot is broadly defined as anyone the Russian Federation deems as valuable for the development of the country. This includes ethnic Russians and emigrants,

¹⁸ See appendix c for a full list of the constitutional amendments.

186,000 of whom emigrated from Russia in 2013 (BBC, 2014). The reasons for emigration vary among population groups: entrepreneurs leave due to endemic corruption and layers of bureaucracy; youth leave to pursue higher education; families leave for better healthcare and schools (de Carbonnel, 2014). Accordingly, the SMPRF's intent is not to attract a enough compatriots to offset demographic losses; instead it is an attempt to encourage the return of the types of professionals that would contribute directly to the diversification and modernization of the economy (de Carbonnel, 2014). As outlined by the SMPRF, these individuals fall into one of several categories: qualified professionals, graduates of Russian educational institutions, and young people with special demand on the Russian labor market. In addition to offering these individuals an incentive package,¹⁹ qualified individuals are also afforded simplified citizenship procedure. The qualifications for "preferred status" largely excludes migrants from Central Asia due to their lack of skills.

Of the 16 total amendments supporting the SMPRF, 25% support easing the resettlement of compatriots. Two amendments passed in 2014²⁰ are noteworthy for their application to foreign affairs, specifically the 2014 annexation of Crimea. These amendments both ease the conditions wherein foreign citizens and stateless persons living on Russian territory are granted citizenship. Applied to Crimea, such conditions offer a smooth transition to Russian citizenship within the newly annexed territory. This application of migration-related law to Russia's near abroad exemplifies the means by which ethnic nationalism affects migration policy.

According to the FMS, only 36,000 individuals participated in resettlement in 2013 (FMS, 2013). Such low numbers can be attributed to the realities of the program: while

¹⁹ Including reimbursement for moving expenses and up to six months living expenses.

²⁰ The Federal Law on Russian Federation Citizenship and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and The Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation, signed into law on 4/21 and 5/08 (respectively).

incentivized, individuals are resettled in target regions, often less-than-desirable locales (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2012). Expatriates, in particular, are unlikely to take advantage of situations that significantly reduce their standard of living, and subject their foreign earnings to Russian appropriation.

6.2 Migration Infrastructure (Section III, 24, b)

Ostensibly, this segment of the SMPRF outlines procedures that would improve conditions for migrants by providing a modern infrastructure comprised of policy initiatives supporting the increased flow of migrant labor of all types into Russia. In recognition of this, the document suggests that the manner in which yearly quotas for migrant labor are determined would be improved to better reflect the needs of the labor market. In addition, this portion of the SMPRF outlines the creation of a seasonal labor as a distinct category of labor migration. In a reiteration of the compatriot portion, this section of the SMPRF is deliberate in identifying desired categories of individuals: entrepreneurs, skilled workers, and highly qualified specialists all make the list of professions likely to receive preferential treatment from the Russian government – again setting conditions that would limit migrants from Central Asia.

Notably, of the 16 migration-related laws passed since the approval of the SMPRF, only one law relates to building the migration infrastructure, an amendment that allows Russian-based shipping companies to hire foreign nationals for up to one year without requiring a work permit. As such, migration infrastructure remains under developed, contributing to the perpetuation of irregular migrants working without a permit and living in Russia without residence permits. Reformation of the quota system – perhaps the most useful and easily implemented policy goal – has yet to be achieved. In five years, the number of quotas has steadily declined; the last two years, in particular, correlate with Putin's return to the presidency. Allowing quotas to directly

match employer needs and removing bureaucratic obstacles to procuring a work permit would substantially reduce the number of irregular migrants; however, inasmuch as Putin's embrace of ethnic nationalism has maintained his power base, it has further limited the ability to reform the quota system despite official recognition of the importance of doing so. The disconnect between policy and reality occurs due to a lack of impartial assessment of irregular migration (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2013), a condition made possible by the vertical power structure coalesced under Putin. It is possible, then, for Putin to echo the assessment of the collective of pro-migrant Russians through public statements and proclamations while at the same time placating his power base by maintaining the status quo.

6.3 Integration Assistance (Section III, 24, f)

Promoting greater integration of migrant groups was aimed at eliminating the ethnic enclaves that have developed as a result of inadequate migration infrastructure. This section contains a number of broad directives, including the promotion of Russian language and culture abroad; combating social exclusion of migrants, spatial segregation, and the formation of ethnic enclaves; and the creation of programs to build constructive interaction between migrants and the host community. A number of highly specific recommendations are also made, including the creation of a television channel dedicated to migrant integration and the establishment of Russian language and legal education programs.

Regarding the broad recommendations, the question of implementation remains. Promoting the Russian culture and language is a difficult task – particularly in the near-abroad where the memory of totalitarian Soviet rule is colored by Russian language and culture being forced upon unwilling recipients. More possible would be the creation of programs and initiatives supporting integration; however, this is rarely conducted through the state alone, and

more often conducted via partnering with civil society – notoriously weak in Russia. While the IOM has worked in this area and is sanctioned by the government, conditions for international NGOs have become increasingly difficult since the passage of the Foreign Agent Law in 2012, which subjects NGOs to heightened oversight by the Russian government in an effort to prevent foreign interference in local politics (BBC, 2012). While this law has yet to affect the work of IOM, its presence adds a layer of bureaucracy and mistrust to already difficult working conditions. Moreover, a local NGO is likely to be more effective than an international NGO, due to increased public buy-in afforded by proximity to and familiarity with migrants and migrant neighborhoods. Ideally, these local NGOs would employ individuals from local migrant populations, further increasing their trust amongst migrant groups. The implementation of the specific recommendations is equally questionable. The provision for creating a television channel with sole mission to promote migrant integration into the Russian culture via educational programming is curious for a number of reasons. First, delineating a specific channel for such programming puts the onus on migrants to integrate, whereas large scale programming promoting broad acceptance of migrant groups would reach society writ large. This suggests the influence of ethnic nationalism. Second, Russian television is largely state controlled and tends to offer programming sympathetic to the Russian government; programming that has been increasingly hostile towards migrant groups in recent years (Mukomel, 2013). Expecting migrant groups to trust programming encouraging the adoption of Russian customs on one channel while being simultaneously berated for the downfall of Russian civilization on another channel belies rational thought.

6.4: Illegal Migration (Section III, 24, g)

The advent of ethnic nationalism – as encouraged by the current political regime – has

transformed the topic of labor migration from a concept assisting the development of Russia to a problem that needs to be solved (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2013). Solutions to this problem in the SMPRF overwhelmingly concern measures related to increased securitization of the Russian Federation. Provisions increasing the penalties for violating migration legislation and increasing state controls on migration dominate this section, with each successive recommendation essentially building upon the preceding recommendation. Given that 50% of migration related laws passed after the SMPRF are related to combatting illegal migration, there are few questions surrounding implementation of these recommendations. Rather, the SMPRF is detached from reality due to the lack of recognition of the visa-free requirement for CIS countries as the cause of irregular migration.

Such incongruence is exhibited in the laws enacted post-SMPRF. Requiring that migrants speak Russian and are HIV-free sounds draconian and potentially restrictive until one realizes that these requirements only come into effect if a migrant applies for a work permit with the FMS. As previously stated, the layers of bureaucracy and existence of a robust labor market currently pushes many migrants from legal registration. Furthermore, an irregular migrant lacking proficiency in the Russian language can turn to the diaspora for assistance. An obvious solution would be eliminating the visa-free status for CIS countries; a solution promoted by more vehement nationalist parties. However, this solution is beset by a number of problems. Primarily, a visa-regime would require Russia to create corresponding infrastructure for processing visas (Golunov, 2014) – a significant cost and burden to an economy already facing a recession in 2015. Additionally, upsetting the status quo in CIS countries – particularly those in Central Asia – could provide additional impetus to look east towards China, a condition that would affect Russian ambitions for the creation of a Eurasian Customs Union. Finally, a visa regime would

essentially trap irregular migrants in Russia, fearing the difficulties that a visa would present in reentering Russia (Golunov, 2014). With no place to go, and no means to apply for a work permit, these migrants would remain trapped in the gray labor market Russia was trying to eliminate.

7. Potential Consequences

The failure of the SMPRF to adequately reform migration policy is the continuation of a policy direction that foments ethnic nationalism as means to distract the Russian public from systemic failures. In a manner similar to Russia's use of the West as a means to define itself on a global stage, the current government takes a combative approach to migrant groups to define *Russian* for a domestic audience; an audience facing economic stagnation and extreme wealth disparity. Migrant groups serve as a convenient scapegoat for the ills of society, and increasing restrictions on migration provides an illusion of progress that obscures a bleak economic future. The reduction of irregular labor by aligning the quotas with the needs of the labor market and simplifying the procedure for both work permits and temporary residency would provide additional tax revenue projected at \$3.8 billion (IOM, 2009). Ignoring this fact exponentially increases the effects of the looming demographic crisis.

An additional consequence involves the rise of far-right nationalism and the xenophobia that surrounds this rise. Fomenting discord towards migrants serves short-term political goals but has long-term consequences: every riot or incident damages the stability that Putin routinely campaigns on. Furthermore, the rise of charismatic anti-Putin nationalists further jeopardizes Putin's power by providing a legitimate alternative whose actions are increasingly more in tune with the public. One such candidate is Aleksei Navalny, whose popularity rests on fighting corruption and opposition to migrants and migration. Navalny's popularity has already affected

Russian politics: the hallmark of his 2013 campaign for mayor of Moscow was opposition to the Islamization of Moscow, which, according to Navalny, is a leading cause of crime and terror in Moscow and is a direct result of Putin's "open-border" policy (Judah, 2013). As such, each candidate – including the liberal party candidate – proposed measures against irregular migrants. A prolonged recession jeopardizing the livelihood of the middle class will only further the legitimacy of an opposition candidate such as Navalny.

8. Conclusion

The challenges of reforming Russian migration policy are unlikely to abate in the near future. In the short-term, migrant groups will continue to suffer from working at the margins of Russian society; in the long-term, ethnic Russians should anticipate a further reduction in their standard of living resulting from a lack of meaningful reform to migration policy – reform that could provide a sustainable labor force and tax base in line with future needs. Solving the crisis requires an accurate assessment of labor needs independent of ethnic nationalist rhetoric. Given the importance of ethnic nationalism to the current political regime, such an assessment is unlikely and will further limit opportunities for meaningful reform.

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Appendix a: Section III of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation to 2025.

III. Objectives, principles, objectives and main directions of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation

21. The objectives of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation:

- a) National security of the Russian Federation, the maximum protection, comfort and well-being of the population of the Russian Federation;
- b) Stabilization and increase in the resident population of the Russian Federation;
- c) Promote the needs of the Russian economy in the workforce, modernization, innovation development and enhancing the competitiveness of its industries.

22. The principles of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation:

- a) Ensuring the rights and freedoms of man and citizen;
- b) Prohibition of all forms of discrimination;
- c) Compliance with national and international law;
- d) Harmonization of the interests of individuals, society and the state;
- e) Reacting the federal authorities, state authorities of the Russian Federation and local governments, the development of institutions of social partnership and civil society;
- f) Protection of the national labor market;
- g) A differentiated approach to the management of migration flows, depending on the purpose and duration of stay, socio-demographic and professional qualifications of workers;
- h) Account of the special regional development; the openness and accessibility of information on migration processes and decisions in the implementation of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation;
- i) Scientific validity of decisions.

23. The objectives of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation:

- a) The creation of conditions and incentives for the relocation of the Russian Federation for permanent residence compatriots living abroad, emigrants and certain categories of foreign nationals;
- b) Development of differentiated mechanisms of attraction, selection and use of foreign labor;
- c) Promotion of internal migration;
- d) To promote educational migration and support academic mobility;
- e) Implementation of humanitarian obligations in respect of forced migrants;
- f) To promote the adaptation and integration of migrants, the formation of constructive interaction between migrants and the host community;
- g) Illegal migration.

24. The main directions of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation:

- a) In the development of our compatriots living abroad, emigrants and certain categories of foreign nationals**

conditions and incentives for the relocation of the Russian Federation for permanent residence:

- Promotion of voluntary resettlement to the Russian Federation of compatriots living abroad and returning emigrants;
- Implementation of the State program to assist the voluntary resettlement to the Russian Federation of compatriots living abroad, its modernization and giving it a perpetual nature;
- Resettlement assistance for permanent residence of qualified professionals as well as other foreign workers in demand in the Russian labor market;
- Creating conditions for migration to the Russian Federation entrepreneurs and investors;
- Resettlement assistance to the Russian Federation of foreign citizens in the purpose of family reunification;
- encouraging migration to the Russian Federation of young people with special demand on the Russian labor market professions and specialties, including the provision of preferences in obtaining a residence permit graduates of Russian educational institutions of vocational education from the foreign nationals who acquire a profession (specialty), demand on the labor market of the Russian Federation;
- Modernization of institutions, a temporary residence permit and residence permit;
- The creation of a points system for the selection of migrants they receive a residence permit;
- the introduction of fast (simplified) procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship by persons with a residence permit and are entrepreneurs, investors, professionals, and members of their families, as well as graduates of Russian educational institutions of vocational education;

b) In the development of differentiated mechanisms of attraction, selection and use of foreign labor, demanded the Russian economy:

- Establish effective mechanisms for assessing the need for foreign labor from the perspectives of development of the economy and national labor market;
- Improving the mechanism of quotas and other regulatory instruments to attract foreign labor;
- Creation of differentiated programs of short-term and long-term labor migration, including the use of various mechanisms of selection, conditions of entry, stay and labor activity, including:
- Programs to attract highly qualified specialists and skilled workers in occupations in short supply and demand in the Russian labor market;
- Programs organized by attracting foreign workers; seasonal programs
- Migration of labor migration and the vacation of foreign students;
- Infrastructure development in the field of labor migration on the basis of cooperation between public, private and non-profit organizations;
- The creation of mechanisms to encourage foreign workers in demand in the Russian labor market, to conclude long-term employment contracts and obtain the status of permanent residents in the Russian Federation;
- Simplification of the rules of entry and residence in the territory of the Russian Federation, foreign citizens arriving for business purposes;
- Simplification of entry and removal of restrictions for employment and training of family members of foreign workers who have signed long-term employment contracts;
- The creation of a mechanism to attract foreign workers for jobs that cannot replace the Russian workers;
- Improve the mechanism for foreign citizens to work on the basis of patents;
- Simplification of entry, exit and stay on the territory of the Russian Federation of foreign citizens involved in investment and entrepreneurship;
- Simplification of entry, exit and stay on the territory of the Russian Federation, foreign citizens who are employees of accredited in accordance with established procedure in the Russian Federation representative offices of foreign legal entities registered in the Russian Federation in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation;
- Improving the system of issuing permits for employment;
- The establishment of centers to promote immigration to the Russian Federation and the medical examination of immigrants, including abroad;

c) To promote the development of the internal migration of citizens of the Russian Federation:

- Simplification of procedures for registration of citizens of the Russian Federation for the purpose of removing administrative barriers to change the place of stay or residence;
- Ensuring citizens' access to social, medical and other types of services at the place of actual residence;
- Informing the public about employment opportunities at moving to another location;

- development of various forms of temporary spatial mobility for employment purposes, including the spread of shift work practices, flexible forms of employment and flexible working hours;
- Educational support (training) migration of Russian citizens, including for the purpose of education and training for occupations that are in demand in the labor market;
- Promoting local internal migration, especially between regional centers, small towns and rural settlements;
- Infrastructure for accommodation and training of internal labor migrants on the basis of public-private partnerships;
- Support regions and territories, conducting active measures to attract domestic workers, including in the framework of federal programs;
- Development of cheap rental housing market segments;
- Development of cooperation between state employment centers with private agencies for employment of citizens of the Russian Federation outside the territory of their permanent residence;
- Improvement of the federal and regional banks vacancies, regional and interregional information exchange systems on employment opportunities in order to increase citizens' awareness of the possibilities and conditions of employment;
- The establishment of funds for implementation of incentive measures to move people to work in other regions, including regions of the Far East;
- increase the investment attractiveness of the Far East, Siberia, and strategically important border areas in order to create the necessary for the relocation of social and transport infrastructure, as well as reducing transport detachment from the regions of Central Russia;
- Development of transport infrastructure, internal and inter-regional passenger transport;
- Subsidization of passenger traffic between the regions of eastern and western parts of the country;

d) To promote educational (training) migration to the Russian Federation and support academic mobility:

- Improving the learning environment in the Russian educational institutions at different levels of training of Russian and foreign students, regardless of their nationality or place of residence;
- Increase the number of students in institutions of higher and secondary vocational education of the number of foreign nationals, mostly citizens of the states - members of the Commonwealth of Independent States;
- Improving the conditions of stay in the Russian Federation, foreign students, their socio-cultural adjustment, health insurance, safety;
- Russian export of educational services in the country - the sources of mass migration to the Russian Federation;
- Facilitate the mobility of professionals involved in teaching, research and expert-analytical work in educational institutions and scientific organizations;
- Organizational, informational and financial assistance to educational institutions and scientific organizations in the implementation of programs of international academic mobility and to attract foreign scientists on the basis of long-term employment contracts;
- Provision of foreign students studying in the Russian Federation, the right to engage in employment during the training period on the same basis as the Russian students;
- Enabling foreign nationals to work in the profession in the Russian Federation immediately after the completion of training at Russian institutions of higher and secondary vocational education;
- The creation of centers of Pre-study of the Russian language in educational institutions of primary vocational education in the countries with the most intense migratory flows;
- simplification of administrative procedures related to the entry and stay in the territory of the Russian Federation of foreign nationals for the purpose of teaching, research and expert-analytical work in educational institutions and research organizations, including participation in conferences and seminars;
- the introduction of a simplified procedure for obtaining foreign nationals to enter the territory of the Russian Federation for the purpose of teaching, research and expert-analytical work in educational institutions and research organizations, and members of their families residing in the status of the Russian Federation;
- Simplification of entry of family members of foreign nationals who had arrived with the aim of teaching, research and expert-analytical work in educational institutions and research organizations, and the removal of restrictions of their employment and training;
- Development of a system of grants to citizens of the Russian Federation, received professional training abroad, in order to facilitate their return;
- Assist compatriots, including their children, living abroad for education in the Russian Federation;

- Development of the minimum required range of services for health insurance for foreign students in educational institutions of the Russian Federation;

e) In the implementation of humanitarian obligations in respect of forced migrants:

- Create favorable conditions for socio-economic and socio-cultural integration of forced migrants, the constitutional rights and freedoms of man and citizen;
- Fulfillment of state obligations of resettlement of persons having the status of internally displaced persons;
- Improving the asylum system;
- The creation of regional and interregional information exchange systems work with forced migrants;
- Facilitating the voluntary return of refugees, persons granted asylum and applicants for the corresponding status in the country of their former homes, as well as resettlement in third countries;
- Provision of forced migrants complete and objective information about the situation in countries and regions of their former residence, the safety of the voluntary return to their former homes;
- Maintenance of infrastructure facilities for the accommodation of forced migrants;
- Development of programs of social support forced migrants;

f) To promote the adaptation and integration of migrants, the formation of constructive interaction between migrants and the host community:

- Promote the development of culture in society interethnic and interreligious relations, the formation of migrants and the host community intercultural skills, combating xenophobia, national and racial intolerance;
- Creating conditions for the adaptation and integration of migrants, including Russian language courses, legal education, information about cultural traditions and norms of behavior by establishing the appropriate infrastructure in their countries of origin and in the Russian regions experiencing the greatest influx of migrants, as well as actively using the potential of the media information and opportunities for cultural adaptation centers in the countries of origin;
- Access of foreign nationals and their family members to social, health and education services according to their legal status;
- Promotion of Russian language and culture abroad;
- Combating social exclusion of migrants, spatial segregation and the formation of ethnic enclaves;
- development, introduction and implementation of programs of adaptation and integration of migrants and their families in the Russian Federation on the basis of the interaction of federal authorities, state authorities of the Russian Federation and local governments, civil society and business structures;
- the creation of infrastructure for the promotion of adaptation and integration, including information centers and legal support workers, language courses, history and culture of the Russian Federation, as well as the creation of a dedicated channel and television cycles focused on the socio-cultural and linguistic adaptation of migrants;
- The creation of programs to build constructive interaction between migrants and the host community;
- Improving the interaction between federal authorities, state authorities of the Russian Federation and local governments with public associations that contribute to adaptation and integration of migrants;

g) In the field of combating illegal migration:

- Improving the legal framework of combating illegal migration;
- Improvement of sanctions for violation of the migration legislation of the Russian Federation;
- The creation and improvement of the system of immigration control by fixing this concept in the system of normative legal acts of the Russian Federation, the definition of competent authorities and a list of relevant authorities;
- Improving the system of state control of entry and stay of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation;
- Opposition organization channels of illegal migration, including by increasing the security of passports and visas and other documents that could identify the person;
- The creation of infrastructure for the implementation of readmission procedures and ensuring public authorities of the Russian Federation functioning of special institutions for the maintenance of foreign citizens and stateless persons subject to administrative expulsion or deportation;
- Improvement of inter-agency cooperation, including the exchange of information at the national level, as

- well as with the competent authorities of foreign countries on combating illegal migration;
- Development and adoption of a program to combat illegal migration, joint interstate preventive operations;
 - Increased information and outreach to citizens, employers in order to prevent violations of migration legislation of the Russian Federation.

Appendix b: Migration Laws passed subsequent to the adoption of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation to 2025.

Policy	Target Area	Description	Date
Amendments to Article 25 of the Federal Law On the Exit from and Entry into the Russian Federation		The Law aims to improve Russia's migration legislation by introducing a common set of rules regarding simplified visa procedures or visa exemptions for foreign citizens entering Russia in accordance with the Russian Federation's international agreements	11/13/2012
Amendments to Article 131 of the Federal Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation and Article 272 of the Law On Education		The federal law is aimed at improving Russian legislation on labor migration with regard to the employment of foreign nationals and stateless persons in Russia in housing and utilities, market trade and services sectors. The Federal Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation has been supplemented with provisions requiring a person applying for a work permit or its renewal and arriving in Russia on a visa-free basis to present a state examination certificate in the Russian language. Amendments to the Federal Law On Education require a foreign national or a stateless person to provide documents or certificates confirming their knowledge of Russian language at the relevant level.	11/14/2012
Amendments to Federal Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation and Article 18.9 and 28.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation.		The law provides social guarantees to migrant workers and imposes administrative responsibility of the inviting party for failing to provide material support, healthcare and housing to the visiting foreign citizen or stateless person during his or her stay in Russia.	1/3/2013

Amendments to Federal Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation		The federal law authorizes shipping companies to hire foreign nationals for a 1-year term without a work permit.	1/3/2013
Amendments to Article 3221 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.		The federal law increases criminal responsibility for organizing illegal entry into Russia of foreign citizens and stateless persons, their illegal stay in Russia or illegal transit through the Russian territory.	1/3/2013
Federal Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation		The Federal Law regulates procedural matters related to establishing the identity of foreign citizens requesting to be granted Russian citizenship or recognized as Russian citizens	5/8/2013
Amendments to Article 16 of the Federal Law On Russian Federation Citizenship		A list of the main grounds for rejecting applications for obtaining or regaining Russian Federation citizenship has been added to the Federal Law	11/4/2013
Amendments to the Federal Law On the Exit from and Entry into the Russian Federation		The Federal Law will improve Russian legislation with regard to ensuring greater protection of Russian passports outside Russia. In accordance with the amendments, electronically stored information in passports that Russian citizens use to certify their identity when abroad, will now contain additional biometric data on the individual (an electronic image of two fingerprints). The scanned fingerprint images will be stored only on the electronic chip in the passport and once the passport has been issued will be deleted from the information systems concerned.	12/23/2013
Amendments to Article 27 of the Federal Law On the Exit from and Entry into the Russian Federation and Article 5 of the Federal Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation		The Federal Law is aimed at streamlining the legal regime regulating temporary stay in Russia of foreign citizens and stateless persons arriving in Russia in a manner not requiring a visa. The amendment introduced by the Federal Law limits the continuous temporary stay in Russia of foreign citizens who have the right to enter Russia in a manner not requiring a visa, to 90 days out of every 180 days	12/30/2013

Amendments to Federal Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals in the Russian Federation and Individual Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation		The federal law is aimed at improving the Russian Federation's migration legislation. The amendments concern medical examination procedures for foreign nationals arriving in Russia under conditions that do not require a visa, who are working on Russian territory for private individuals or studying in Russia full time. The amendments establish that when such foreign nationals apply for work permits (licenses) in the Russian Federation, they are required to present documents stating that they are free of drug addiction and illnesses indicated on the corresponding official list of infectious diseases that pose a threat to those around them, as well as a certificate stating that they are not infected with HIV. In accordance with the federal law, failure to present the indicated documents serves as a basis for refusing to issue (or extend) a work permit or license to a foreign national.	12/30/2013
Amendments to Federal Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation.		The Federal Law is designed to improve legislation regulating migration in the Russian Federation regarding the introduction of mandatory documents proving the knowledge of the Russian language, history and basic legislation of the Russian Federation for citizens of other countries applying for temporary or permanent residence permit, work permits or patents, except for highly qualified experts.	4/21/2014
Amendments to the Federal Law On Russian Federation Citizenship and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation		The federal law sets simplified procedures for granting Russian Federation citizenship to foreign citizens and stateless persons living on Russian territory and recognized as Russian-speakers.	4/21/2014
Amendments to Article 13 of the Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation		The Federal Law is aimed at improving Russia's migration legislation as regards labor activities in Russia by foreign citizens recognized as refugees or having received temporary refugee status in accordance with the Federal Law On Refugees.	5/5/2014

Amendments to Federal Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation and Individual Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation to Create Additional Favorable Conditions for Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons Studying in the Russian Federation.		The Amendments create the opportunity for foreign citizens to combine work and study in Russia, grants special rights to foreign students wishing to work in Russia, creates additional education opportunities for migrant workers in Russia, and provides Russian compatriots the opportunity to study at Russian educational institutions.	6/24/2014
Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation to Improve the Russian Federation Legislation on Special Migration Institutions		The Federal Law is aimed at improving the Russian Federation migration legislation concerning statutory regulation of issues of detaining foreign nationals and stateless persons subject to administrative expulsion from the Russian Federation, deportation or readmission, in special facilities of the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS). To this end, the Federal Law amends the Federal Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation establishing procedures for detaining foreign citizens and stateless persons in Russian FMS facilities subject to administrative expulsion from the Russian Federation, deportation or readmission, and establishes that the list of federal executive migration officials, as well as their territorial agencies, empowered to make decisions on deportation or readmission, is to be approved by this federal agency. Furthermore, the Federal Law introduces administrative liability of foreign citizens and stateless persons for administrative offenses committed during their stay in special Russian FMS facilities, and specifies procedures for civil proceedings in cases arising from said legal relations.	7/23/2014

Amendments to particular Russian Federation Laws and Statutes in order to Improve Immigration Law and the Penalties for its Violation		<p>The amendments aim to improve Russia's immigration laws regarding prevention of illegal immigration and tougher penalties for violating the laws in this area. Amendments to the Federal Law On Entering and Exiting the Russian Federation make it possible in specific cases to refuse foreign citizens or stateless persons entry to Russia. An amendment regarding work permits for foreign citizens has been made to the Federal Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation. Amendments to the Russian Federation Administrative Offences Code toughen the administrative penalties for violation by foreign citizens or stateless persons of the rules for entry into Russia, staying on Russian territory, and working illegally in Russia. Administrative penalties have also been toughened for giving false information to the migration registration authorities, and for evading administrative penalties.</p>	7/26/2014
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